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Military-Humanitarianism 
Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli 
ABSTRACT: This chapter accounts for the geographies of military-humanitarianism: the 
spaces through which it operates and, in turn, changes; and the spatial transformations it 
has undergone in the Mediterranean “of” migrants. Building on the analysis of two recent 
Mediterranean scenes—the criminalization of acts of solidarity through military-
humanitarianism and the EU warfare against migrant smuggling networks—we study 
military-humanitarianism as a spatial process, where neither the “military” nor the 
“humanitarian” predicaments of this mode of intervention are taken at face value. The 
chapter develops an approach to the study military-humanitarianism as a flexible 
technology for migration control. We conclude by sketching a critical geography research 
agenda on military-humanitarianism that would take into account the different forms of 
capitalisation over migrants that are at stake in the humanitarian and military government 
of refugees. 
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The Spaces of Military-Humanitarianism  
Military-humanitarianism has long become a key migration management tool (Garelli 
and Tazzioli, 2016, 2017a and b; Loyd et al, 2016; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015 and 
2017Williams, 2015). This has contributed to framing migration crises as situations to 
forcefully intervene on and, on the other hand, to performing operations of migration 
containment in the name of saving migrants. Military-humanitarianism in fact describes 
two intertwined processes: the deployment of military forces for performing humanitarian 
tasks (e.g., rescuing migrants at sea), and the militarization of humanitarian work (e.g., 
the use of military technologies by NGOs working in situation of humanitarian crisis). 
In this chapter we are interested in accounting for the geographies of military-
humanitarianism: the spaces through which it operates and, in turn, changes; and the 
spatial transformations it has undergone in the Mediterranean “of” migrants.  In other 
words, our focus is on military-humanitarianism as a spatial process, where neither the 
“military” nor the “humanitarian” predicaments of this mode of intervention are taken at 
face value.  
We start from two recent scenes of military-humanitarianism in the Mediterranean Sea in 
order to both situate this flexible technology for migration control in the context we are 
speaking from, historically and politically, while, at the same time, clarifying our 
methodological approach to it. 
 Criminalizing Acts of Solidarity through Military-Humanitarianism 
At the end of July 2017, the Italian government approved a “Code of Conduct"1 to 
regulate the action of independent organizations engaged in search and rescue operations 
in the Mediterranean Sea, de facto mandating the militarization of humanitarian actors 
engaged in preventing border-deaths at the Mediterranean frontier of the EU. 
In 2014, in fact, the Mediterranean Sea started to be actively patrolled by humanitarian 
fleets. While the mobilization of non-state actors to support refugees fleeing by sea dates 
back to the late 1970s with the Vietnamese boatpeople crisis, and continued throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s—most prominently with the German Cap Anamur missions—the 
2014 mobilization in the Mediterranean Sea was unprecedented in terms of forces 
deployed. In this context NGOs2, independent actors3, and philanthropists4 in fact, 
enlisted their own fleets and deployed their means to detect boats in distress and assist 
with rescue operations (Cusmano 2017, Cuttitta 2017, Stierl 2017). An under-estimate of 
the lives rescued through these activities speaks of about 84,300 people (Zandonini 
2017). 
This is the context where Italy, with the support of the EU, intervened, and mandated that 
all non-state actors engaged in SAR operations in the Mediterranean have, among other 
things, to militarize their humanitarian actions by accepting the presence of armed police 
on board their vessels, in breach of the humanitarian and pacifist mandate of some of 
these organizations. In fact, Doctors without Borders5, Sea Watch6 and Jugend Rettet7, 
refused to sign the Code, claiming that their ability to provide humanitarian support was 
contingent on two factors that signing the Code would force them to dissolve: first, the 
neutrality with respect to state powers; second, their non-militaristic approach and 
equipment. As a consequence of their rebellion to the Code, these organizations’ boats 
were denied access to Italian ports, and Jugend Retter was put under trial with the 
allegation that the organization collaborates with Libyan smugglers in organizing migrant 
journeys. 
As we argued elsewhere (Garelli and Tazzioli, forthcoming), the Code of Conduct has to 
be read in relation to the criminalization of acts of solidarity with migrants (Fekete, 2009; 
Fassin, 2017; Tazzioli, 2017) that European countries and the EU as a whole have been 
forcefully engaged with in the past few years, claiming that individual citizens’ and 
organizations’ solidarity actions were in fact a sort of humanitarian smuggling, 
breaking—albeit for humanitarian purposes—the 2002 EU Directive which prevents and 
penalizes “the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and residence” of undocumented 
migrants. 
 
Military-Humanitarianism, Migration Containment, and Migrant Bodies at Sea  
In May 2015 the European Union launched its first warfare intervention in the field of 
migration, with EU Navfor Operation Sophia, a naval operation deployed for disrupting 
smugglers’ operations in the Central Mediterranean. While the militaries have long been 
involved in Mediterranean scene of migration as they acted in compliance with the 
international obligation to assist seafarers in distress, this was the first EU warfare 
operation specifically aimed at intervening on the logistics of migration. In fact the EU 
naval operation aimed at disrupting the “business model”8 of smuggling networks, by 
identifying, capturing and disposing of vessels used for ferrying migrants to Europe.  
 
The humanitarian predicament of the EU warfare against smuggler was underlined from 
the outset as the mission was presented as a military intervention aimed at protecting 
migrants from smugglers and to “reduce the loss of lives at sea”. While the Libyan 
smuggling industry’s abuses against migrants and predatory economy have been widely 
documented (e.g., UN 2017), it remains that smugglers are in fact the only passage 
available for people fleeing violence and destitution at home, when EU visa policies 
make it practically impossible for refugees to legally access Europe, resettlement 
programs serve less than 1% of the entire refugee population, and the EU relocation 
programs for refugees are at a dramatic stall.  
 
In this context, the disruption of the Libyan smuggling industry corresponds to a 
migration containment agenda: blocking the central Mediterranean route to Europe. So 
far this military-humanitarian intervention resulted in dramatic consequences for the 
people trying to access a safe country out of Libya. The presence of Operation Sophia by 
the Libyan coasts, in fact, while initially produced an effect of deterrence on Libyan 
smuggling networks, soon prompted them to find new approaches to their business and 
migrant journeys to Europe through Libya simply became more dangerous and expensive 
as a result.9 
 
Retaining our focus on military-humanitarianism as a migration management technology, 
which we approach through a spatial analysis, two important elements should be 
underlined. First, military-humanitarianism is a forceful migration containment tool in a 
situation of intersecting crises. The first crisis we are referring to is the humanitarian and 
political crisis people are fleeing from as they reach Libyan smugglers, ostensibly 
qualifying them as potential asylum seekers in Europe. The second crisis we are referring 
to is the political crisis of Europe, unwilling to respond to this situation with a politics of 
refuge and instead showing its litigious face as states opt out of the “burden sharing” 
mandate to collectively help with the refugee crisis at the borders of Europe. In this 
context, a hunt against smugglers to protect refugees against their abuses conveniently 
performs the blockage of refugees in Libya against their desire to seek refuge in Europe, 
hence performing a containment effect on migration flows across the Mediterranean. It 
also provides a humanitarian backing to the warfare enlisted against “the logistics of 
migrant journeys” (Garelli and Tazzioli 2017a and b). In other words, military-
humanitarianism allows state powers  to enlist a politics of refugees’ spatial containment 
away from Europe and in a place where their lives will certainly be at risk, if not of a 
possible shipwreck en route to refuge, of certain abuses in a country like Libya.  
 
Second, we also want to zoom in and look at the human geography of this intervention 
from the vantage point of refugees themselves, at the elemental scale of their individual 
bodies. In his published conversation with Etienne Balibar Nicholas De Genova 
suggested that “we should consider that the most elementary space is that of the body 
itself” and, he continues, “[we should] think about the mobility of bodies across the 
Mediterranean, the distribution of bodies across the Mediterranean” (Balibar and 
DeGenova, 2017). From this vantage point, military-humanitarianism looks like a 
flexible technology that allows state-powers to zoom in and out of the body of refugees 
according to the political need of the moment. So, for instance, when the Italian military-
humanitarian Operation Mare Nostrum was established, its bipolitical goal was the 
humanitarization of the shipwrecked refugee to be rescued from the waters (Basaran, 
2015)—and eventually abandoned to various forms of destitution on land in Italy (Pinelli, 
2017). With Operation Sophia the biopolitics of military-humanitarianism fences up and 
intervenes against the logistics of refugees’ arrivals in Europe: refugees’ bodies become, 
on the one hand, something to protect the EU from, to keep off shore, off the European 
shores, through the military-humanitarian warfare against the smugglers ferrying them 
there; and, on the other hand, bodies to be protected from smugglers’ abuses. 
 
In both cases—the criminalization of acts of solidarity and the containment of refugees’ 
bodies away from Europe—military-humanitarianism is a tool that allows migration 
management to turn to a “securitarian offensive” through military means and under the 
humanitarian banner.  
 
 
The spatial rerouting of military-humanitarianism 
 
The humanitarian government of migrations is depicted as a EU-led practice, in spatial or 
in substantial terms. Indeed, even in the case of humanitarian refugee assistance in non-
European countries, most of the times European agencies play a major role in 
coordinating and monitoring local organisations. Similarly, military-humanitarianism 
tends to be narrated in the media as a mode of intervention put into place and coordinated 
by Western states. More precisely, military-humanitarianism in the field of refugee 
management is highly geographically connoted, as it is seen as a South-to-North practice. 
In this regard, the Italian Mare Nosturm Operation has been a case in point: between 
October 2013 and December 2014, migrants in distress at sea used to be rescued very 
close to the Libyan waters and then ferried to Italy (Tazzioli, 2015). The “Navy-taxi”, as 
many detractors called Mare Nostrum, was entirely managed by Italy and, moreover, 
after being taken out of the sea, migrants disembarked on the Northern shore of the 
Mediterranean. Such spatial orientation - from South-to-North - of the “humanitarian 
border” (Walters, 2011) actually discloses the main predicaments of the politics of 
protection: that is, refugees should be protected from “rogue states” (Derrida, 2003) and 
Western countries are the only true holders of humanitarian criteria. In other words, both 
human rights and humanitarianism are predicated upon a Euro-centered geography. 
However, such a narrative appears to be quite misleading today, in light of the 
undergoing transformations and reshaping of military-humanitarianism in the 
Mediterranean. Furthermore, and beyond geopolitical considerations, we contend that it 
is part of a critical account of military-humanitarianism to disengage from a Eurocentric 
gaze on it, projecting on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean. 
 The transformations that have recently occurred in military-humanitarianism have in fact 
showed that, far from being totally driven by the EU, third-countries, such as Turkey and 
Libya, are decisive actors on the Mediterranean chessboard and pursue their own 
economic and geopolitical interests (Cassarino, 2014, 2016, 2017). Yet, accounting for 
the active role played by third-countries in containing and managing migrants in the 
Mediterranean region, does not simply involve widening the geographical focus nor to 
think of military-humanitarian practices as ways of acting that travel from the Northern to 
the Southern shore of the Mediterranean. Rather, it entails mapping the different 
nuances of migration governmentality and the different modes in which the biopolitics of 
rescuing and letting drown is played out.  
 
The argument that we want to push forward is twofold. First, through the recent bilateral 
agreement between Italy and Libya, there has been a substantial spatial rerouting of 
military-humanitarianism; or better, the implementation of the bilateral agreement has 
accelerated and made visible the agreements and arrangements that have been put into 
place over the last three years through political negotiations. Second, military-
humanitarianism has been redefined through the blueprint of the war on smugglers. 
Relatedly, as we will illustrate later in this section, the unconditional humanitarian goal 
of saving migrant lives at sea has become subordinated to what we call containment 
through rescue.  
 
It is important to clarify that the fight against migrant smugglers does not represent a new 
entry in the EU political agenda; even when Mare Nostrum was in place, curbing the 
“illegal” economy of migrant crossing was officially considered a political priority along 
with the duty of rescuing migrants in distress at sea. However, we want to suggest that 
the war on smugglers has recently gained centre stage in the Mediterranean geopolitical 
scenario. More importantly, it is not only on a quantitative level but also on a qualitative 
one that the declared fight against smugglers has impacted on military-humanitarian 
operations. Indeed, since the launch of the EU naval operation Eunavfor med-Sophia in 
May 2015, the prioritisation of the fight against smuggling networks has reshaped the 
modus operandi of rescue vessels and, at once, the biopolitical predicaments that sustain 
military-humanitarianism (Garelli, Tazzioli, 2017a and b). 
 
By speaking of a spatial reorientation of military-humanitarianism we refer to landing 
places where migrants rescued at sea are taken. If during Mare Nostrum migrants were 
transferred to European member states, the implementation of the Italian-Libyan bilateral 
agreement has officially set forth what in practice was already enacted on the sly: 
migrants are intercepted and rescued by the Libyan Coast Guard and pushed back to 
Libya.  
 
Such a spatial rerouting of military-humanitarianism shows us, in fact, an essential 
transformation in the effects of rescue practices: being rescued finally equates with being 
captured: people are fished out of the water but are not put into safety. Migrants are taken 
back to Libya, the “transit” country they reached to flee war, persecution, and destitution 
at home. On a more technical level, rescue and interception activities are conflated and 
the boundaries between the two get blurred, both on a legal dimension and on a practical 
one (Heller, Pezzani, 2015). Indeed, migrants in danger in the Mediterranean Sea are 
however heading towards Europe, so by being rescued by the Libyan Coast Guard, they 
are actually hampered from reaching the European shores. Instead, by sending SOS calls 
to the Italian Coast Guard and demanding to be rescued, migrants were de facto ferried to 
Europe.  
 
Gregoire Chamayou’s analyses on manhunt helps capturing the ambivalences of the 
biopolitics of rescuing and letting drown: indeed, this latter is not only about saving or 
not saving migrants at sea but also, in a more proactive way, about pointing to human 
targets. With manhunting, Chamayou explains, “the combat zone tends to be reduced to 
the body of the enemy, which must then, according to the principle of distinction, be the 
only space that is targeted; but, on the other hand, it is believed that this mobile micro-
space can be targeted wherever it happens to be” (Chamayou, 2011). Yet, who is the 
target of the humanitarian migrant-hunt in the Mediterranean? Actually, it is not only the 
migrant in distress at sea, who in fact is rescued and captured at the same time; rather, 
migrants and smugglers are both, on paper, the preys of military-humanitarianism.  
 
Hence, what is left of humanitarianism? Humanitarian interventions get split from a 
politics of protection, which are apt to bring migrants to safety, and recognizing them as 
refugees (Cuttitta, 2017; Sciurba, Furri 2017): humanitarianism is relegated to a 
biopolitics of rescuing and letting drown, which consists of simply fishing out (or not) 
migrants from the sea. This would mean in fact corroborating the image of a “good 
humanitarianism”, free of articulations/entanglements with security and military modes 
of intervention. Rather, we point to the fading away of the refugee at sea as the 
emblematic figure of humanitarianism, a figure that turns out to be superseded by the 
battle against smuggling networks. 
 
We do not see military-humanitarianism as an antinomic couplet in which we need to 
rescue one of the two terms against the other: on the contrary, military-humanitarianism 
in all its variations and specific enactments, constitutes a logics and a mode of 
governmentality characterised by the use of humanitarian reasons and measures in 
military operations and/or the deployment of military actors and technologies for 
performing humanitarian task. Nonetheless, military-humanitarianism should not be seen 
as the mere juxtaposition of military and humanitarian measures and rationales, nor as a 
coherent “sovereign machine of governmentality" (Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013).  
 
The multiple entanglements between military and humanitarian approaches, actors and 
techniques have in fact generated transformations in the way of conceiving and enacting 
humanitarianism. While humanitarianism is traditionally conceived as the set of measures 
implemented for “alleviating human suffering” (Barnett, 2011), military-humanitarian 
operations deployed in the Mediterranean for saving migrants reshape humanitarianism 
as a politics of rescue, that is, as fishing people out of the sea. Related to that, the central 
role played by military tactics and actors in saving migrants make blatant the ambivalent 
effect of rescue: upon being rescued at sea, migrants are de facto captured, taken back to 
Libya, or transferred to the Hotspots in Italy and in Greece. To put it shortly, the 
biopolitics of rescuing and letting drown, played both by military actors (such as the 
Navy) and humanitarian organisations (such as Doctors without Borders and independent 
search and rescue vessels) narrows the focus to the sea-scenario. The geographies of 
military-humanitarianism at sea correspond to the scene of rescue and are ultimately 
defined by the contested boundaries of jurisdiction, competence and non-responsibility 
that criss-cross the Mediterranean - formed by national waters, contiguous waters and 
Search and Rescue areas. 
 
Therefore, a thorough critical appraisal of military-humanitarianism requires, instead, 
engaging in a spatial-temporal stretching of the analysis beyond the space of the sea. This 
consists of exploring the functioning and the effects of military-humanitarian measures 
according to a temporal and a spatial “after” with respect to the sequel of interception-
rescue-capture in the Mediterranean. Similarly, we contend that what is left out of the 
picture, in critical analyses on military humanitarianism, are what can be called the 
“geographies of ungreviability” (Tazzioli, 2017). Indeed, the recent multiplication of 
bilateral agreements between member states and African countries has moved back 
deadly frontiers from the Mediterranean Sea to the Libyan and Niger desert. As a 
consequence of this type of agreements, migrants who do not die at sea but who manage 
to arrive in Libya are kept in detention in the Libyan prisons.  
 
The function of Libya as a spatial linchpin and pressure valve for Mediterranean 
migrations is certainly not new. In fact, the crucial role played by Colonel Ghaddafi in 
managing migrations until 2011, and in using migrants as human bombs as a form of 
pressure on European states, is well known. Soon after the fall of Ghaddafi in February 
2011, Libya was initially depicted by the EU as a rogue state at the limits of 
ungovernability, in particular due to the lack of a unique central government. However, at 
the same time both the EU and the UN started to consider Libya as a country that needed 
help in its way towards democracy and sovereignty. Even though there are currently three 
separate governments in the country, the task of supporting Libya towards sovereignty is 
at the core of the EU political agenda. However, the meaning of containment has visibly 
changed over the last three years.  Under Ghaddafi, the regime was engaged with 
temporarily containing migrants in Libya in exchange for Italian investments in the 
country, while smugglers were engaged in organizing complex logistics of migrant 
crossing.   In the past three years the situation has radically changed and now the 
smuggling and state economy is focused on attempts to contain migrants in Libya 
(Morone, 2016). 
 
The construction of the Libyan space of migration containment directly involves 
European agencies, such as Frontex, and international agencies, such as IOM and 
UNHCR. UNHCR in fact was sent away from Libya by Ghaddafi in 2010 and is now 
back supporting Libyan authorities despite the countries has never signed the 1951 
Geneva Convention on refugee protection. Both IOM and UNHCR currently operate in 
the country contributing to what can be called the twofold system of detentive hosting 
and humanitarized detention that rescued migrants are subjected to. Indeed, after being 
rescued-and-captured by the Libyan Coast Guard and taken back to Libya, migrants are 
transferred from Libyan port to detention centres and prisons where they are blackmailed. 
As it has been shown by journalist investigations, the same smuggling networks that the 
European Union officially wants to dismantle, do actually work in complicity with 
Libyan state authorities and, indirectly, with the European organisations that are on the 
ground. In particular, Italy has unofficially signed on the sly agreements with Libyan 
militias to stop migrants’ departures from the country, thus financing directly the 
smuggling networks that it condemns (Harchaoui and Herbert 2017; Michael, 1017; 
New York Times editorial board, 2017). 
  
The underneath negotiations between the Italian government and Libyan militias show 
that Italy and EU’s goal is not to tackle the migrant smuggling networks, as an “illicit” 
economy but, rather, to undermine migrants’ “logistics of crossing” (Garelli, Tazzioli, 
2017 a and b). If, on the one hand, the war against smugglers gained center stage in the 
EU political agenda and at the level of public media, on the other, the deal with Libyan 
smugglers to stop migrants from leaving the country tells us that the actual targets of 
military-humanitarianism are migrants.  
 
With the deployment of European and international agencies in Libya, military-
humanitarianism and border enforcement cooperation finally overlap: UNHCR, Frontex 
and IOM are in fact assisting Libyan authorities providing both technical equipment, 
training activities and personnel deployed at the ports to improve migrants’ registrations 
and in detention centres “for strengthen the Government’s humanitarian capacity”.  The 
EU’s intervention and support to Libyan detentive hosting can be seen as the bestowing 
on Libya of migration containment measures and, at once, as a path towards the 
externalisation of the asylum. Yet, we contend that such a view reiterates the Eurocentric 
narrative which sees Libya as Europe’s puppet, erasing in this way both Libya’s political 
and economic interests as well as the (relative) autonomy and specificity of the Libyan 
economy of migration.  
 
The political tenet of the EU-Libya strategy of migration containment consists in 
depicting Libya as a “safe country”: the same space that under Ghaddafi and soon after 
his fall was considered a hell for migrants, is now presented by European agencies as a 
country which is in the road towards humanitarianism, heading to match international 
human rights standards. Such an alleged Libya’s transition towards safety and human 
rights that starkly contrasts with direct testimonies about violence and blackmailing that 
migrants are subjected to. The humanitarized detention has been illustrated by the Italian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Angelino Alfano who argued that “in Libya there won’t be 
lagers anymore, but humanitarian camps”. Hence, among the many variations of military-
humanitarianism, we come to grips with the humanitarization of the inhuman which takes 
place through the articulation of military and humanitarian actors in Libya. Looking at 
the Libyan context of migration containment, the threshold of the inhuman appears as the 
limit-point of military-humanitarianism and that remains fundamentally undertheorized 
given the taken-for-granted image of the refugee at sea to be saved as the subject par 
excellence of humanitarianism.  
 
 
Conclusion: The militarisation of humanitarian rescue 
The reshaping of military-humanitarianism concerns also humanitarian actors and the 
humanitarian logics as such. The implementation of the Code of Conduct for NGOs in 
Italy has formally sanctioned the duty for NGOs involved in search and rescue activities 
to equip with security and military measures/assets. Armed judiciary policemen are 
requested to be on board of NGOs vessels and, more broadly, search and rescue activities 
are put under direct control of the Italian Coast Guard. Yet, in order to escape the 
humanitarian narrative that sees humanitarian and military actors as in opposition to each 
other, is important to notice that some independent actors were already equipped with 
military and security technologies. This is the case of MOAS, the first non-governmental 
actor that deployed a rescue vessel in the Mediterranean in 2014: since the beginning, 
MOAS used drones for detecting migrants at sea and accepted to exchange data with 
Frontex. 
 
The increasing militarisation of NGOs’ activities has been actualised through a spatial 
shrinking of the operation range. Libya’s decision on August 10, 2017 to implement a 
Search and Rescue zone (SAR) came out of the blue and, in fact, is not recognised by the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) yet - so, it is still unofficial and the result of 
an arbitrary sovereign act. A SAR zone officially designates state’ zone of competence - 
and thus, of legal responsibility - in search and rescue operations and in coordinating 
vessels, even from other countries, that come across boats in distress. Instead, by 
activating its SAR zone, Libya has declared its jurisdiction - and not competence - on that 
area, hampering NGOs from entering there in order to do search and rescue. Thus, in the 
place of improving and granting safer rescue operations, paradoxically Libya’s 
establishment of a SAR zone has worked keeping humanitarian actors out of the scene.  
 
The official bulletin of migrants rescued-and-captured by the Libyan Coast Guard is quite 
discontinuous: some days Italian or Libyan authorities communicate the approximate 
number of migrants saved and then taken back to Libya, but the absence of data and 
official dispatches is more frequent. According to IOM, 13,148 migrants have been 
saved, or captured, in Libyan waters in 2017. In fact, the gap between effective migrant 
departures, number of people saved and returned and of unreported shipwrecks can be 
hardly closed. The politics of migration containment at sea is in fact played by states 
from the northern and the southern shore of the Mediterranean also by producing grey 
zones of jurisdiction at sea, and holes of traceable events.  
 
The partial lack of statistics and numbers regarding migrants rescued and returned by the 
Libyan Coast Guard actually also depends on the fact that migrants are not allowed to 
leave. Indeed, as the Italian Coordinator of Doctors without Borders put it, “even more 
than intercepting migrants at sea and returning them to Libya, Libyan authorities together 
with the militias do not allow migrants to leave, and the smuggling economy itself is 
partially blocked for the moment”. Indeed, the reported number of migrants rescued and 
returned by the Libyan Coast Guard in August 2017 was half the number in July - 608 
between August 7 and August 21, 1298 between July 21 to August 6 - revealing a 
substantial drop in departures.  
 
Consequently, military-humanitarianism has partially shifted from the scene of the sea 
towards measures of detentive hosting and humanitarian-ized detention on the mainland. 
This does not mean that the biopolitics of rescuing and letting drown has come to an end. 
Despite the scene of rescue has been shrunk, some NGOs continue to conduct search and 
rescue activities in the Mediterranean and military vessels both from the European naval 
operation Eunavfor and from the Italian Navy and Coast Guard patrol and do rescue 
operations. Yet, what we want to suggest is that from an almost exclusive focus on the 
scene of the sea, military-humanitarianism has been re-crafted as a politics aiming at not 
letting migrants leave. In this way, humanitarianism itself is substantially reshaped: 
protection becomes synonymous of containment, insofar as keeping them in Libya is 
presented as a strategy for not letting them die at sea. 
 
A critical appraisal of military-humanitarianism entails, however, bringing issues related 
to the bio political economy of migrations into focus. More precisely, we refer to the 
modes of value extraction from the commodification of migrant bodies that are run in 
parallel (and that in part sustain) the military-humanitarian management of migration in  
Libyan jurisdiction (at sea and on land).  
 
We want to conclude by pointing to future research paths that should take into account 
the different forms of capitalisation over migrants that are at stake in the 
humanitarian and military government of refugees. In particular, we contend that further 
research should critically engage with the nexus between forced mobility and 
commodification of migrant bodies. Over the last decade there has been a proliferation of 
journalist reports and academic work on migration and contemporary forms of slavery, 
referring not only to trafficking but also to migrants being blackmailed and sold from one 
militia to another. Yet, such a literature conflates slavery and migrants being subjected to 
violence and forced to be sold in order to come to Europe. In this regard, we suggest 
shifting attention from slavery as such towards the capitalisation over migrants’ desire to 
move on the part of European states and third-countries, as well as of smuggling groups.  
 
A critical migration geography approach should further investigates the emergence of 
new economic spaces and of spatial economies related to the military-humanitarian 
government of migrations. Migration geography analyses could contribute to destabilise 
the Eurocentric view on military-humanitarianism, not by simply inverting the gaze, from 
South to North, but by bringing into focus the mobile spaces of governmentality that 
emerge, between the sea and the land, from practices of humanitarian containment.  
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